In 1965 Dag Prawitz presented an extension of Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduction to modal concepts of S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros showed in 2006 that the proof of normalisation for classical S4 does not hold and proposed a new proof of normalisation for a logically equivalent system, the system NS4. However two problems in the proof of the critical lemma used by Medeiros in her proof were pointed out by Yuuki Andou in 2009. This paper presents a proof of the critical lemma, resulting in a proof of normalisation for NS4.
Introduction
In his Ph.D. thesis, Dag Prawitz [4] extended the Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduction (ND) to modal concepts, obtaining Gentzen-type systems of ND for S4 based on classical, intuitionistic and minimal predicate logic. For this purpose, a modal operator of necessity (here represented by ) was added together with the rules for its introduction and elimination. Prawitz then presented three formalizations of those modal systems, which differed in the restrictions on the introduction rule for the , and stated that only the third one would accept the Normalisation Theorem.
About forty years later, Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] argued that Prawitz's normalisation procedure does not work on the third version of the ND system for classical S4, and proposed a new system for S4, the NS4, for which the Normalisation Theorem would hold.
However, recently Yuuki Andou [1] pointed out two problems in the proof of a lemma (the critical lemma) that plays a crucial role in Medeiros' s proof of the Normalisation Theorem. Andou presented a Normal Form Theorem [1] , showing that for any proof Π there is a proof Π ′ in normal form by means of cut-elimination, but do not present a normalisation procedure.
In this paper we present a correction of Medeiros's proof of the aforementioned lemma and fulfil a normalisation procedure for NS4, which gives a computational interpretation of proofs by means of the Curry-Howard Correspondence.
After some definitions used in the present work (Section 2), we outline the original third version of Prawitz's system for classical S4 and the counterexamples by Medeiros (Section 3). We then discuss the two cases in which the system may not produce valid derivations on NS4 due to problems in the proof of the critical lemma (Section 4). In Section 5 we present a proof of the critical lemma for NS4. Our concern here is with Classical Propositional S4, but an extension of Classical First Order S4 could be easily obtained by adding the corresponding rules for quantifiers.
Definitions
Based in the work of Maria da paz Medeiros [3] , we present the definitions used in this work.
, and the premisses B 1 , ..., B n of (I ) are called major premisses and the others minor premisses.
Definition 2.
A segment in a derivation is a sequence A 1 , ..., A n of occurrences of the same formula in a branch such that A 1 is not the conclusion of an application of (E ∨ ) nor a discharged assumption through an application of (I ), and A n is not a minor premiss of (E ∨ ) nor a major premiss of (I ).
Definition 3. The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences in this segment.
Definition 4.
A maximal segment in a derivation is a segment A 1 , ..., A n such that A 1 is the conclusion of an application of an introduction rule or (⊥ c ), and A n is a major premiss of an application of an elimination rule.
Definition 5.
A maximal formula is a maximal segment whose length is 1(one). A premiss is called maximal premiss if it belongs to some maximal segment.
Definition 6.
A formula A is a trivial formula if A is the conclusion of an application of (⊥ c ) and the minor premiss of an application of (E → ) whose major premiss is the assumption ¬A.
Definition 7. The degree of a formula A, G(A), is the number of occurrences in A of logical symbols different from ⊥. The degree of a segment is the degree of the formula that belongs to this segment. 
Definition 12.
A formula A is essentially modal when each occurrence of a predicate parameter or predicate constant in A stands within the scope of an occurrence of .
A counterexample for Prawitz's classical S4 system
According to the restriction on the -I rule in Prawitz's third version of S4, if a formula A depends on an assumption B and there exists an essentially modal formula F on the thread of A from B such that A depends on every assumption which F depends on, then -I could be applied at A.
But Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] argued that such restriction would not avoid maximal formulas by pointing out that although the following derivation
is valid in S4, its reduction is not:
It was presented a new Natural Deduction for S4 system, called system NS4 and proposed a normalisation proof by critical lemma [3] . This new system is composed of the logical symbols ∧, ∨, →, ⊥ and and the usual rules, except for -I, which is as follows:
, where no two B i 's are equal.
We also write [ B] k to indicate that each B i is discharged at k. Labels may be dropped.) This restriction on -I rule states that all the assumptions in [ B] k must be discharged by the application of -I and the premiss A must not depend on any assumption other than the ones in B. The reason for this is explained in item 4 of the proof of the critical lemma and it does not affect the completeness of the system.
Together with this new -I rule, we have the following reduction:
and the permutative reduction bellow:
A problem in the normalisation proof of NS4
Medeiros's normalisation proof [3] begins with the assumption that a derivation Π of C from Γ can be transformed in a derivation Π 0 . The aim is to show that I(Π 0 ) < I(Π). Next, it uses a critical lemma according to which, if Π is a critical derivation of C from Γ, then Π can be transformed into a derivation Π ′ such that I(Π ′ ) < I(Π). By the critical lemma, a subderivation Σ of Π can be transformed in a subderivation Σ ′ such that I(Σ ′ ) < I(Σ); but, then, Π 1 is the derivation resulted from the substitution of Σ ′ for Σ in Π 0 , and I(Π 1 ) < I(Π 0 ).
However, recently Yuuki [2] pointed out two flaws in the proof of Medeiros's critical lemma. The first one concerns critical derivations of the form
where the major premiss F is the conclusion of ⊥ C and r is an elimination rule. According to Medeiros, this derivation can be transformed into
depending on C being ⊥ or not.
Note that the assumptions of the form ¬F discharged at the rule i may occur more than once in Π, and that the premiss F which is conclusion of Σ 0,1 may be a maximal premiss in Π ′ and in Π ′′ . In this case the index of either Π ′ or Π ′′ may be even greater than that of Π. Besides, one of the H i 's in H, say H l , may be a maximal formula of degree G(F ) and, in this case, even if the F side connected with ¬F is not a maximal formula in Π ′ , this H l still is and the induction hypothesis cannot be used.
The second problem pointed out is when Π has degree G( A) and is a critical derivation of the form
If A occurs more than once as top-formula of Λ 2 , by reducing Π to
the number of occurrences of A as maximal formula in Π ′ will be greater than in Π.
Thus, it is possible that the reduction process generates copies of maximal formulas, so the index of Π ′ may be greater than that of Π.
Yet another proof of the critical lemma
We present a proof of the critical lemma for the fragment {∧, →, ⊥, }. Extensions to First Order Logic is only handwork.
Lemma 1. A critical derivation of the form
where F is the conclusion of ⊥ c , can be transformed in a derivation
where Π 1 is a derivation without trivial formulas. Thus, the end-formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is not conclusion of ⊥ c .
Proof. See the work of Medeiros [3] .
Note that Π 1 has no more maximal formulas of degree equal to or higher than G(F ) than Π. We will use the symbol ∝ to indicate the transformation of a derivation into a derivation without trivial formulas.
Proof. Suppose Π is a critical derivation with maximal premisses of degree G(Π) which are premisses of the last inference of Π, #G(Π) is the number of maximal formulas of Π with degree G(Π) and ℓ(Π) is the lenght of Π. The proof is by induction on the pair #G(Π), ℓ(Π) .
Π
It is easy to see that G(Π ′ ) < G(Π).
If there exists a B l which is a maximal premiss at Π ′ , then it would be a maximal formula at Π and, as Π is a critical derivation, G( B l ) < G( C). Thus, G(Π ′ ) < G(Π).
We have two cases to consider: (a) there is an occurrence of A which is top-formula of Λ 2 and major premiss of an application of -E : in this case, the number of maximal formulas of degree G( A) in Π 1 may be even greater than that of Π, as there may be more than one occurrence of A as top-formula of Λ 2 .
There is a critical subderivation Ξ 1 of Π 1 of the form B
(b) there is an occurrence of A which is top-formula of Λ 2 and major premiss of -I : then, there is a critical subderivation Ξ 2 of the form
The lenght of Ξ 2 is smaller than the lenght of Π. Hence, by induction hypothesis, we can reduce Ξ 2 to a Ξ ′ 2 such that G(Ξ ′ 2 ) < G(Π). Note that we cannot guarantee that the lenght of Ξ 2 is smaller than the lenght of Π if there were more than one occurrence of A as top-formula of Λ 2 in Π 1 , and if there were many occurrences of A as major premiss in Ξ 2 . That is the reason of the restriction on the beginning of the section.
Let Π 2 be the result of replacing each occurrence of critical subderivations of the form of Ξ 1 and the form of Ξ 2 in Π 1 by Ξ ′ 1 and Ξ ′ 2 respectively. If A is the only major premiss that is maximal formula in Π, i.e., there is no member of H which is a maximal premiss of the same degree of Π, then G(Π 2 ) < G(Π) and Π 2 = Π. Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a m such that H m is a maximal formula in Π, then #G(Π 2 ) < #G(Π) and, as Π 2 is a critical derivation, by induction hypothesis Π 2 can be transformed into a derivation Π ′ such that G(Π ′ ) < G(Π 2 ). Hence, as Π was transformed into Π 2 and G(Π 2 ) is not higher than G(Π), G(Π ′ ) < G(Π).
Π ≡
If the end formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then the end-formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is not a maximal formula and G(Π 1 ) < G(Π) and Π 1 ≡ Π ′ . If the end formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π 1 is of the form
which can be reduced to
If the end formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then G(Π 1 ) < G(Π) and Π 1 ≡ Π ′ . If the end formula of Σ ′ 1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π 1 is of the form
If one of the B i 's, say B m , were a maximal formula in Π 2 , it would be a maximal formula in Π and, as Π is a critical derivation,
is a critical derivation, its lenght is smaller than the lenght of Π. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, Λ can be reduced to a derivation Λ ′ such that G(Λ ′ ) < G(Π). The result of replacing each occurrence of Λ in Π 1 by Λ ′ is a derivation Π ′ such that G(Π ′ ) < G(Π).
of Π 1 is smaller than Π. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, Λ can be reduced to a derivation Λ ′ such that G(Λ ′ ) < G(Π). By replacing each occurrence of Λ in Π 1 by Λ ′ we achieve the desired derivation. This case deals with classical ⊥ with the elimination of implication, conjunction and box.
If ¬F → C were a maximal formula in Π ′ , it would be a maximal formula in Π, which is not the case as, by hypothesis, G(Π) = G(F ) and G(F ) < G(¬F → C). Hence, G(Π) < G(Π ′ ).
Conclusions
This work presented the problem pointed out by Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] on the normalisation procedure proposed by Dag Prawitz [4] , followed by the system that she proposed [3] , the NS4. She presented a normalisation proof for this system for which we presented the problems pointed out by Yuuki Andou [2] and finally we presented a proof of the Normalisation Theorem for NS4.
Among other deductive systems for S4, there are some where the Normalisation Theorem holds, like Sequent Calculus. There is also a Natural Deduction with Labels system by Alex Simpson [5] for which the Normalisation Theorem holds. But the system proposed by Dag Prawitz [4] and Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] are pure Natural Deduction systems, without semantic interferences (as the labels from the system of Alex Simpson) for which there are no previous proof of the Normalisation Theorem known into the available literature. Yuuki Andou showed that for any proof of S4 there is a normalised proof via cut-elimination [1] but did not present a normalisation procedure. We fulfilled it by presenting a correction in Medeiros' proof that lead to a normalised Natural Deduction system for S4, the NS4 system.
